Facts Are Stubborn Things:  An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-To-The-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting by Saleska, Scott R. & Engel, Kirsten H.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 8
Issue 1 Fall 1998 Article 3
Facts Are Stubborn Things: An Empirical Reality
Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-To-




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Saleska, Scott R. and Engel, Kirsten H. (1998) "Facts Are Stubborn Things: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over
the Race-To-The-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol8/iss1/3
"FACTS ARE STUBBORN THINGS": AN
EMPIRICAL REALITY CHECK IN THE
THEORETICAL DEBATE OVER THE
RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM IN STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETTING
Scott R. Saleskat and Kirsten H. Engeltt
INTRODUCTION
A central rationale for placing primary responsibility for environ-
mental protection with federal authorities-as opposed to state or local
authorities-is the long-standing belief that, in the absence of federal
regulation, state governments will engage in a welfare-reducing "race-to-
the-bottom" in environmental standard-setting for the purpose of at-
tracting and retaining mobile industries.1 According to this rationale,
failures in the national market for "industrial firm locations," such as the
failure illustrated by the classic "prisoner's dilemma" of non-cooperative
game theory, 2 provide economic incentives that discourage individual
' Energy and Resources Group, U.C. Berkeley. Currently post-doctoral fellow, Depart-
ment of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Harvard University.
tt Associate Professor, Tulane Law School, Visiting Associate Professor, Harvard Law
School, Fall 1999.
1 The "race-to-the-bottom" theory has existed as a legal rationale for the imposition of
national minimum environmental standards under federal environmental statutes such as the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
LJ. 1196, 1211-12 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and Quasi-
Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713, 747 (1977); Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant
Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IowA L. REv. 1, 29 (1988); Vicki
Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Condi-
tions Doctrine, 91 COLuM. L. Ray. 473, 509 (1991).
2 In the traditional story that accompanies the prisoner's dilemma, two prisoners who
are accused of committing a crime are separately interrogated by the district attorney and each
faces the same two choices: "cooperate" (with each other) by maintaining silence about the
crime; or "defect" by confessing joint involvement in the crime. Each prisoner is unable to
consult with the other prisoner in determining what course of action to follow. If both remain
silent, the district attorney will only have sufficient evidence to convict the two of a lesser
crime for which there is a light sentence; however, if both confess, each is given a sentence of
moderate severity. If one confesses but the other does not, the one who confesses is rewarded
with release while the silent prisoner is punished with the harshest possible sentence. In the
classic prisoner's dilemma, the punishments are arranged such that overall time served (the
sum of the two jail terms) is least if neither confesses. But because each has the possibility of
getting a better individual deal (full release) if she confesses, and because each risks getting a
worse individual deal (the harshest possible sentence) if she remains silent, each follows her
56 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
states from adopting optimally stringent environmental standards. The
results of such a "race-to-the-bottom" are inadequate environmental stan-
dards, poor environmental quality, and lower overall social welfare. The
consensus solution to this problem consists of legally binding agreements
reached collectively by state representatives at the level of the federal
government and enacted as federal law.3 The federal environmental
laws, because they are national in scope, provide a minimum environ-
mental quality threshold for states, thereby circumventing the environ-
mentally-based interstate competition for industries that would otherwise
drive a race-to-the-bottom. 4
Six years ago, Professor Richard Revesz initiated a heated debate
within the legal academic community concerning the integrity of the
race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal environmental regulation.
Revesz argued that there was no race-to-the-bottom in state environmen-
tal standard-setting, and that interstate competition should actually be
own self-interest and confesses. For a discussion of the theoretical aspects of the prisoner's
dilemma and its application in economics and social science see: ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLuTnON OF COOPERATION 7-11 (1984); R. DuNcAN LucE & HowARD RAIFFA, GAMEs AND
DECISIONS: INTRoDucrnoN ANr CRITICAL SuRvEY 95 (1967); SHAuN P. HARGREAVES HEAP &
YANrs VARouFAmis, GAmE TnEoRY: A CRITCAL INTRODUCTION 146-66 (1995); ERIc RAs-
musEq, GAMEs AND INFoRMATION 17-18 (1994).
3 In practice, the national environmental laws are implemented through a cooperative
arrangement between state and federal authorities. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y); Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692; Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1211,
1221-1230(a), 1231-1243, 1251-1279, 1281, 1291-1309, 1311-1316, 1321-1328; Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761; Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f)-
3000)(26); National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k); Clean Air Act
("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCARA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050. Although na-
tional in scope and implemented through regulations promulgated by the federal Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, many of the federal environmental laws provide for the delegation of
permitting and enforcement responsibilities to state officials with the federal government re-
taining some oversight. See, e.g., FWPCA, 42 U.S.C. §1342(b) (providing for the delegation
to states of the Clean Water Act's industrial discharge permitting and enforcement powers);
CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661(a), (b) (providing for the delegation to states, of industrial air pollu-
tion discharge permitting and enforcement powers); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (providing for
the delegation of the power for states to create permitting program for hazardous waste dispo-
sal facilities).
4 Because federal environmental laws specify that less stringent state standards are pre-
empted by stronger federal standards, but often allow state standards that are more stringent
than federal standards, federal standards impose environmental quality "floors," but not always
"ceilings." See, e.g., FWPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (prohibiting states from adopting or
enforcing water standards less stringent than those promulgated under the Act, but otherwise
retaining state authority to adopt water standards); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (same with respect
to air standards).
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viewed as welfare-enhancing rather than welfare-reducing. 5 The theoret-
ical foundation for Revesz's argument is neoclassical economics, accord-
ing to which ideally competitive markets lead to economically-efficient
outcomes. Revesz extended this theory to the public sphere and argued
that competitive markets will also lead to efficient levels of local govern-
ment-supplied environmental protection. 6
The theoretical foundation for the race-to-the-bottom argument, by
contrast, is non-cooperative game theory, a branch of economics in-
vented specifically to deal with particular exceptions to the "ideally com-
petitive market" assumption underlying much of neoclassical
economics. 7 The classic prisoner's dilemma model, which is perhaps the
simplest example of a welfare-reducing game, can be used to illustrate
conditions under which the interstate market is not ideally competitive
and to show why two states might consequently establish sub-optimally
lax environmental standards in order to attract industry-even though
they would both be better off if they collectively maintained optimally
stringent environmental standards. 8 Unlike the "spillover" rationale for
5 See Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the Race-to-
the-Bottom Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1211-
12 (1992) ("contrary to prevailing assumptions, competition among states for industry should
not be expected to lead to a race that decreases social welfare; indeed, as in other areas, such
competition can be expected to produce an efficient allocation of industrial activity among the
states").
6 See hi. at 1253.
7 Von Neuman and Morgenstem developed game theory out of frustration with those
assumptions of neoclassical economics that are inappropriate for markets consisting of rela-
tively few players. In such small markets, the two scholars showed that the actions of any
single individual would depend upon how that individual believed the other participants would
respond to her actions, much like the attitude of players in a game. See generally JOHN VON
NEuMANN & OSKAR MORGmSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1947)
(this book is considered the birthplace of modem game theory); MAN=Cu OLSON, JR., THE
LoGmC OF CoLLEcnvE ACTION (1965) (applying game theory to the problem of public goods);
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243-45 (1968) (applying game theory
and the prisoner's dilemma to environmental problems specifically).
8 The analogy between the prisoner's dilemma and states' use of regulatory standard-
setting to compete with other states for mobile industries is a simple one. In brief, states
engaged in competition for industry can be thought of, in the most simplistic model, as facing
two basic choices: (1) maintain the stringency of their existing environmental standards, or (2)
relax the stringency of their environmental standards. States face a dilemma similar to the
prisoner's dilemma if, through the relaxation of their standards (assuming there are no changes
in any of the other states' standards), one state can attract industries currently located in other
states. In such a situation, each state will relax its standard so as to capture the economic
benefits of additional industries, although collectively the states engaged in the competition
would be better off if they maintained the stringency of their existing standards. See Kirsten
H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is it "to-the-Bot-
tom"? 48 HAsTiNrS L.J. 271, 304-05 (1997) (for a concrete example of this 'Environmental
Regulator's Dilemma"). Other scholars analogize interstate competition in environmental
standard-setting to the prisoner's dilemma. See, e.g., Kathryn Harrison, The Regulator's Di-
lemma: Regulation of Pulp Mill Effluents in the Canadian Federal State, 29 CAN. J. POL. Sa.
469 (1996); James A. Brander, Economic Policy Formation in a Federal State: A Game Theo-
1998]
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federal regulation, 9 the race-to-the-bottom argument does not apply
strictly to environmental problems resulting from interstate externalities,
such as the "spillover" of air or water pollution across state boundaries.
Instead, the race-to-the-bottom argument is based upon the need to cor-
rect environmental problems whose effects may be contained wholly
within a state's boundaries, but whose causes are rooted in interstate
competition that takes place under less-than-ideal conditions.
Revesz and others following him argued, however, that a race-to-
the-bottom in state environmental standard-setting was an economic fic-
tion, and had "no theoretical foundation."'1 Reasoning by analogy,
Revesz asserted that since interstate competition in environmental stan-
dard-setting is efficiency-enhancing in an economic model developed by
Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab," we should expect that interstate
competition in the real world is likewise efficiency-enhancing. 12 Thus,
retic Approach, in INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIoNs 33, 47-49 (Richard Simeon ed., 1985);
Revesz, supra note 5, at 1229-31; PETER S. MmtEL & RIcHARD B. STmwART, ENvioRNMEN-
TAL LAW AND POLICY 246 (1994); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and Interna-
tional Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2058-59 (1993).
9 According to the "spillover" rationale, federal intervention is necessary to prevent the
environmental, social and economic losses resulting from interstate pollution because the
originating state has insufficient incentive to curb the pollution (because they benefit from
having the harmful effects of pollution externalized) and the dispersion of the pollutants may
prevent the injured state from seeking legal recourse through an action in nuisance or trespass.
See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1215-16 (explaining spillover rationale); Thomas W. Merrill,
Remarks as Third Panelist on Panel III: International Law, Global Environmentalism,,and the
Future of American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 486 (1994) ("The spillover ar-
gument is in many respects the most obvious justification for federalization" of environmental
law.).
10 Revesz, supra note 5, at 1244. Revesz's claim that there is "no theoretical founda-
tion" for a race-to-the-bottom is a puzzling one, in light of the well-developed foundation for
such a race provided by the half-century of scholarship in non-cooperative game theory. See
supra note 7 (for references); see also James A. Brander, Economic Policy Formation in Fed-
eral State: A Game Theoretic Approach, in INTERGovERNmENTAL RELATIONs 33, 47-49 (Rich-
ard Simeon ed., 1985); and Eli M. Noam, Governmental Regulation of Business in a Federal
State: Allocation of Power Under Deregulation, 20 OSGOODnE HALL L.J. 762-72 (1982) (apply-
ing prisoner's dilemma-like models to the race-to-the-bottom problem in the context of a fed-
eral system of states).
I1 See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdic-
tions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PuB. ECON. 333, 336-39 (1988).
Oates and Schwab construct a neoclassical economic model in which jurisdictions indepen-
dently establish efficient environmental standards despite competing against one another for a
mobile stock of capital. In the model, the jurisdictions may entice mobile capital either by
lowering taxes or by relaxing environmental standards. Lower taxes lead to increased capital
and hence higher wages, but at the expense of lower public revenues. Laxer emissions stan-
dards also lead to increased capital and hence increased wages, but at the expense of environ-
mental quality. Under these constraints, rational regulators in the individual jurisdictions will
choose both an efficient environmental standard and tax rate. The efficient environmental
standard will be the standard that corresponds to the point at which the marginal private cost of
pollution equals the marginal private benefit from additional capital. See Engel, supra note 8,
at 305-09 (for a more detailed explanation of the model).
12 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 1211-12.
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Revesz concludes that there is no race-to-the-bottom. 13 Revesz's article
did not call attention to the fact that his conclusions depend on the "ide-
ally competitive market" assumption, even though game theory rose to
prominence as a branch of economics in the past forty years, in large part
because of the widespread failure of that assumption in real-world econo-
mies. The article also failed to consider what empirical evidence might
exist supporting his proposed analogy between the Oates and Schwab
model and the real world. Revesz made no argument-empirical, theo-
retical, or otherwise-for why his preferred model should be considered
more plausible than the alternative, prisoner's dilemma-like models of
non-cooperative game theory. 14 He nonetheless asserted, on the basis of
the Oates and Schwab analogy alone, that there was little reason to be-
lieve that the effects of interstate competition upon state environmental
standards were welfare-reducing, and that interstate competition instead
should be presumed to be efficiency and welfare-enhancing.' 5
A central thesis of our article is that simple assertions of the applica-
bility of one theory or another, in the absence of any consideration of
evidence about the way the world actually works, constitute what we
refer to as "theoretical hubris," a problem that is unfortunately not un-
common in the legal literature. The palliative for theoretical hubris is
"stubborn facts" that put proposed theories to the empirical test. In a
recent article, Engel began applying this empirical palliative in the con-
text of the race-to-the-bottom debate. 16 Drawing from a large economic
literature on firm location studies, together with data from a survey she
conducted of state environmental regulators and others influential in state
environmental standard-setting, Engel argued that state environmental
standard-setting, in the absence of a national federal backstop, would re-
sult in sub-optimal environmental standards. 17
13 See id.
14 Near the beginning of his article, Revesz (to illustrate the position he will argue
against) presents a simple prisoner's dilemma-like model of interstate competition in environ-
mental standard-setting that results in a race-to-the-bottom. See Revesz, supra note 5, at 1229-
33. While Revesz explains the Oates and Schwab model, which produces a different (effi-
cient) outcome, he fails to indicate why the latter model should trump the former one.
15 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 1229-33; see also Henry R. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey,
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regula-
tory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 42-45 (1996) (rejecting the race-to-the-bottom ration-
ale for federal environmental regulation on the grounds that there are variations in local
preferences for environmental quality and an asserted association between wealth and higher
levels of environmental quality).
16 See Engel, supra note 8.
17 See id. at 351-59.
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Since then, Revesz responded 18 to Engel's criticism, as well as to
the comments of his other critics, Daniel Esty,19 Joshua Sarnoff,20 and
Peter Swire.21 Although he does not present any empirical evidence of
his own, Revesz criticizes Engel's empirical argument as being insuffi-
ciently compelling.22 Instead, Revesz's rejection of federal environmen-
tal standards relies almost solely upon a "presumption in favor of
decentralization" 23 that may be rebutted if there is "a systemic evil in
letting states decide the level of environmental protection that will apply
within their jurisdictions." 24 Thus, Revesz indicates that this "presump-
tion" should substitute for empirical evidence concerning what is, at bot-
tom, an empirical question.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the race-to-the-bottom debate,
replies to Revesz's critique of Engel's empirically-based argument, and
presents new empirical findings to support Engel's initial conclusions
that, in relaxing their environmental standards to attract mobile industry,
a substantial minority of states engage in welfare-reducing race-to-the-
bottom behavior.25 Part II proposes possible explanations for the appar-
ent irrationality of many state environmental regulators that is inferred
from empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that some regulators
are engaged in a race-to-the-bottom. 26 In brief, our claim in Part I, that
some states engage in a race-to-the-bottom, rests upon our finding that
states relax their standards in order to attract industry, despite a large
body of studies indicating that economic performance is unaffected by
18 See Richard Revesz, The Race-to-the-bottom and Federal Regulation: A Response to
Critics, 82 M-NN. L. REv. 535, 535-37 (1997).
19 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MicH. L. RFv. 570,
627-38 (1996) (because states act strategically and the market for environmental-policy-driven
location rights is relatively imperfect, untrammeled regulatory competition among states pro-
duces sub-optimal state environmental standards).
20 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspec-
tive)for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 278-84 (1997)
(arguing that, even if correct, Revesz' argument for the efficiency of state environmental stan-
dard-setting relies upon the appropriateness of aggregating resident preferences for environ-
mental quality and economic well-being on the state level, whereas aggregation at the national
level may be more appropriate and yield different measures of social welfare).
21 See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67,
94-104 (1996) (arguing that the market failures that define environmental problems contradict
the assumptions underlying the economic models predicting the efficiency of state environ-
mental standard-setting despite interstate competition for mobile industry).
22 See Revesz, supra note 18, at 554-56.
23 Id. at 536 ("My starting point is a rebuttable presumption in favor of
decentralization.").
24 Id. at 537 ('This presumption for decentralization should be overcome, however, if
there is a systemic evil in letting states decide the level of environmental protection that will
apply within their jurisdictions.").
25 See infra text accompanying notes 28-55.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 56-75.
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environmental stringency and that industry is largely indifferent to varia-
tions in stringency of environmental standards when making location de-
cisions. Part II seeks to answer the question: Why might state
regulations be set at seemingly irrational, i.e., low, levels?2 7 This seem-
ingly irrational standard-setting results in sub-optimally low environmen-
tal standards just as would a prisoner's dilemma dynamic. As we discuss
in Part II, however, the real world behavior of state regulators points to a
dynamic different from both the classic prisoner's dilemma-like race-to-
the-bottom and the neoclassical models of ideal competition.28 Drawing
on the economic development policy literature, a simple model of deci-
sion-making under uncertainty is proposed, which illustrates a plausible
incentive structure that would explain why state policy decisions are not
always rational for the state as a whole, even if they are rational from the
perspective of the individual decision-makers who make state policy. Fi-
nally, in Part III an empirically-based risk-benefit approach to environ-
mental law and policy that takes account of the inevitable uncertainties
faced by policymakers is proposed. We advocate this approach as a pre-
ferred alternative to what we call the "ideological stacked deck" of
across-the-board presumptions.
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF A RACE-TO-THE-BOTITOM IN
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETING
A. TESTING THE "RAcE-To-THE-Bo-rroM" HYPOTHESIS WrrH
EMPnuCAL EVIDENCE
Although it is generally acknowledged that competition among
states to attract or retain industries causes states to relax their environ-
mental standards,29 such relaxation by itself does not constitute a race-to-
27 The terms "rational" and "irrational" are used in their precise economic sense: deci-
sions that maximize expected net welfare are by definition rational while decisions that avoid
welfare-maximizing choices in favor of sub-optimal ones are by definition irrational.
28 The data raise this third possibility because it provides a picture that is inconsistent
with both a classic prisoner's dilemma-like model and with ideally-competitive neoclassical
models: both of these modeling approaches assume that industry location decisions are signifi-
candy affected by stringency of environmental standards. Further, both modeling approaches
assume rationality in decision-making, i.e., that a state, when faced with several alternatives,
will always opt for the one with the highest expected net social welfare payoff. The data we
present here suggest that states which lower standards are not acting rationally from the per-
spective of overall state welfare. Essentially, these states are failing to choose the alternative
that would be best for the state as a whole. Since the data does not support the theory that
interstate competition mirrors the classic prisoner's dilemma, nor does it mirror competitive
efficiency, it must be concluded that a third possibility, consisting of state regulators reacting
to incentives different from that of the state as a whole, best explains the empirical data.
29 In addition to revising existing standards to make them less stringent, "relaxation" in
this context also refers to the failure to adopt an environmental standard in the first place, or to
delay the adoption of a standard. Given that the existence of lowered standards in response to
interstate competition rests upon anecdotes rather than a systematic study, it is surprising that
19981
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the-bottom. For purposes of the current scholarly debate, a "race-to-the-
bottom" refers to a relaxation of state environmental standards that also
results in lower net social welfare. 30 In arguing that there is no "race-to-
the-bottom," Revesz is not necessarily contending that states do not relax
their standards in response to interstate competition for industry, but that
the relaxation of standards does not occasion any lessening of social wel-
fare.31 Revesz's scenario could result from state standards that were too
high in the first place, i.e., a situation in which lower standards return to
the state sufficient additional economic benefits to more than make up
for the welfare losses that followed from the lowering of state environ-
mental quality.32
In a prior article, 33 Engel assembled empirical evidence to test the
race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and argued that the evidence refuted the
proposition that state competition is efficiency-enhancing, and that it in-
stead tended to support the idea that interstate competition for industry
results in a welfare-reducing race-to-the-bottom in state environmental
standard-setting. Engel's evidence consisted of: (1) data from a survey
of state environmental regulators showing that a substantial minority of
state regulators admitted a willingness to relax their state's environmen-
tal standards out of a conviction that lax standards are important to at-
tracting and retaining industries; 34 and (2) the widely replicated results of
both policy-makers and scholars alike assume that the relaxation of standards is the natural
state response to interstate competition. Part Ill of this Article presents data from a survey that
tested this assumption. See infra text accompanying notes 76-84.
30 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 1219.
[A] race to the bottom requires not just the existence of a "race," but also that the
race be "to the bottom." This latter element requires, first, that a competitive juris-
diction adopt a less stringent pollution control standard than an otherwise identical
island jurisdiction would have adopted. Second, it requires that the less stringent
standards that emerge from the competitive process be socially undesirable.
Id.
31 See id. at 1241, 1243.
32 Thus, Revesz's critique extends only to federal regulation and the belief that this regu-
lation prevents a race-to-the-bottom. His critique does not extend to federal standards intended
to prevent any relaxation of state environmental standards caused by interstate competition,
regardless of the impact upon total social welfare. Nor does Revesz's critique undermine
federal standards deemed necessary according to a rationale other than the race-to-the-bottom,
such as the need to prevent interstate spillovers, to take advantage of economies of scale, or to
enforce a human right to minimum levels of public health. See Engel, supra note 8, at 285-87.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 337-47. The survey data relied upon in Engel's article and in the present
paper came from responses to a mailed questionnaire sent to five groups of people influential
in state environmental standard setting: state environmental agency officials (air and water
officials, as well as officials in the State Administrator's office), state legislators, state eco-
nomic development officials, representatives of state chambers of commerce, and staff of state
citizen environmental organizations. The survey asked each group of respondents five sets of
substantive questions relevant to the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. The survey found that reg-
ulators and economic development officials in many states are concerned about industry relo-
cation and siting, that such concern does influence their environmentally related actions,
[Vol. 8:55
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econometric studies showing that stringency of state environmental stan-
dards is a small to negligible factor in industry-location decisions.35 In
one prominent firm location study, for example, Timothy Bartik was able
to rule out the existence of all negative effects upon industry location
attributable to environmental regulatory stringency, with the exception of
very small effects.36 Engel argued that this data, taken together, pro-
vided support for the logical inference that if (a) states compete for in-
dustry by relaxing environmental standards (as indicated by (1) above),
but (b) industry location is substantially unaffected by this competition
(as indicated by (2) above), then (c) interstate competition will result in a
lessening of state welfare because the state fails to gain economic bene-
fits to offset its environmental quality losses. 37
B. THE REvEsz RESPONSE AND THE QUESTION OF THE "BASELINE"
Professor Revesz criticizes the logic behind Engel's conclusion that
states are engaged in a race-to-the-bottom by observing that the conclu-
sion assumes that the starting point, or "baseline," from which a state
relaxes its environmental standards, pursuant to interstate competition,
must be presumed to be optimal or less than optimal in order for the
consequence to be a race-to-the-bottom. 38 Revesz suggests that it is pos-
sible that the "baseline" environmental standard of an "island" jurisdic-
tion might be inefficiently high, in which case lowering standards will
not signal a race-to-the-bottom, but will instead bring the state's stan-
dards closer to their optimal level.39 Revesz speculates that a state might
policies and standards, and that a substantial minority of states have, at some point in the past,
relaxed their standards in response to this concern. See iUd. at 377-98 (Appendix) (The methods
used to conduct the survey and a full summary of the survey's results can be found in the
article.).
35 See id at 321-37 (studies cited and discussed ); see also Arik Levinson, Environmen-
tal Regulations and Manufacturers' Location Choices: Evidence from the Census of Manufac-
tures, 62 J. PuB. ECON. 5 (1996) (Although Levinson uses a broader range of industries and
measures of stringency than had been used in previous studies, he confirms earlier studies by
showing that interstate differences in environmental regulations do not systematically affect
the location choices of most manufacturing plants.).
36 See Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Business Location
in the United States, 22 GROWTH AND CHANGE 22, 23 (1988). To give some indication of
what "small" means in this context, Bartik reports that if a state were to tighten its standard for
particulate reduction (the most sensitive of the environmental parameters tested) by an amount
sufficient to raise its rankings from the national average to the top one-third in state environ-
mental stringency, the state would lose no more than 3.3% of the total number of new plants
that would have located in its state had the state never tightened its particulate standard. See
id. By contrast, the same size change in the percentage of a state's labor force that is union-
ized would produce a 30-40% drop in the number of new firm sitings. See id. at 33.
37 See Engel, supra note 8, at 351-54 (for a more detailed explanation of this
conclusion).
38 See Revesz, supra note 18, at 555.
39 Id.
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set sub-optimally stringent baseline environmental standards "perhaps
because the state believed that it had 'monopoly power' in the market." 4°
While Revesz correctly points out an important assumption underly-
ing Engel's approach to demonstrating the existence of a race-to-the-bot-
tom, he offers nothing to counter the assumption that a state's pre-
competition baseline is optimal or sub-optimal, except his own unsup-
ported speculation that states might believe themselves to be monopo-
lists. There is no basis, however, for thinking this to be true. Both
leading economic models of interstate competition that Revesz discusses
assume that the environmental standards of an "island" jurisdiction, or a
jurisdiction that does not engage in interstate competition, will be opti-
mal. For example, the Oates & Schwab model, upon which Revesz's
argument relies, assumes that an island jurisdiction's environmental stan-
dards will be optimal.41 Similarly, the prisoner dilemma model also as-
sumes that, in the absence of interstate competition, states will establish
optimal environmental standards. 42
Other prominent models, public choice analysis being the most im-
portant,43 would tend to predict that an island jurisdiction would adopt
sub-optimally lax environmental standards. 44 According to the economic
theory of regulation, laws tend to respond to the wants of small, cohesive
special interest groups, such as industry, at the expense of the wants of
the larger, more diffuse public. 45 The public, which is the intended ben-
eficiary of stringent regulation, is often in a weaker political position
than industry, which is the primary beneficiary of less regulation.46
According to public choice analysis, a state's baseline environmen-
tal standards are likely to be sub-optimally lax. Any lessening of state
standards from the public choice baseline most assuredly results in a
race-to-the-bottom. Although Revesz argues that there is no basis to
think that the under-provision of environmental law posited by public
choice analysis is any more severe at the state level than at the federal
level, he does not appear to question the essential public choice claim
40 Id.
41 See Oates & Schwab, supra note 11, at 336.
42 See Engel, supra note 8, at 304-05.
43 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA.
L. REv. 275, 285 (1988) (public choice scholarship applies the lessons of game theory to the
dynamics of interest groups seeking legislation).
44 See OLsoN, supra note 7, at 44 (problem of free-riders more severe for large groups
than for small groups); Eskridge, supra note 43, at 286-87.
45 See Olson, supra note 7, at 44; Eskridge, supra note 43, at 286-87.
46 See Swire, supra note 21, at 101.
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that interest group politics will under-provide for public goods like envi-
ronmental protection.47
In the end, however, the question of whether the baseline is optimal
or sub-optimal is one that can be answered with empirical evidence. If
the Revesz speculation that the baseline is too high is in fact correct, then
this should be demonstrable by observation: lower environmental stan-
dards should in fact be associated with increased overall social benefits.
Such an observation would, by definition, imply that the prior baseline
was sub-optimally high. On the other hand, if increases in benefits are
not observed to be associated with reductions in environmental stan-
dards, Revesz's speculation that they might be too high is empirically
refuted. It is to this empirical question that we now turn.
C. FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF A RACE-To-THE-B OTtOM
To further test the conclusion that a substantial minority of states
engage in a welfare-reducing race-to-the-bottom, we constructed addi-
tional hypotheses and tested them against additional empirical data. If
interstate competition for industry through environmental standard-set-
ting is welfare-enhancing (the "efficiency hypothesis"), then three condi-
tions should hold for states that engage in such competition: (1) they
should have laxer environmental standards, and hence, potentially worse
environmental quality than similarly situated states with more stringent
standards; but (2) they should experience stronger economic performance
than their less competitive neighbors; and (3) they should experience net
welfare gains after trading off (1) for (2).
Analysis of the third condition is beyond the scope of the study
because it would entail a detailed cost-benefit assessment of economic
and environmental gains and losses, including consideration of differ-
ences across state populations in preferences and marginal rates of sub-
stitution between environmental and economic amenities. The first and
second conditions, however, when taken together, present an initial hur-
dle that must be overcome before the third condition becomes relevant.
If there are environmental losses, but no detectable economic gains as a
result of interstate competition, then the detailed cost-benefit calculus
entailed in testing the third condition becomes academic. Under such
circumstances there are no economic gains to be "traded off' against the
environmental losses and the efficiency hypothesis is refuted.
47 See Revesz, supra note 18, at 559 ("The public choice analysis in this article has
explained reasons to expect both levels of government to under-provide environmental law,
compared with the baseline of what the voters prefer.").
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1. Does Regulator Competitiveness Enhance Economic
Performance?
We conducted an empirical study of the first and second conditions,
which together comprise the "initial hurdle" described above. To con-
duct this test, we used data on state economic performance, including
growth in employment, growth in per capita income, and growth in gross
state product. This data was obtained from the most recent statistics
available from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Survey of Current
Business.48 We used data on state environmental quality, including air
and water pollution, from the widely-used "Green Index. '49 We then
sorted state regulators according to the degree of "competitiveness" they
exhibited in their responses to survey questions designed to measure the
extent to which they compete against other states for industry through
environmental standard-setting.50 Finally, we compared each state's de-
gree of "competitiveness" against indicators of environmental quality
and economic performance. If competition is welfare-enhancing, as the
efficiency hypothesis posits, regulator competitiveness should be nega-
tively correlated with indicators of environmental quality (the first con-di
tion), but positively correlated with indicators of economic performance
(the second condition).
The results of our initial analysis are summarized in Table 1 and
Figure 1. These results suggest that a state's willingness to "compete"
with other states by lowering environmental standards is associated with:
(1) either no detectable effect or a significant negative effect on environ-
48 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT Busnq-ss (1995).
49 BOB HALL & MARY LEE KERR, 1991-1992 GPEm' INDEx: A STATE-BY-STATE GuIDE
TO TiH NATION'S ENviRONmNrrAL HEALTH (1992).
50 The competitiveness indicator was derived by taking state regulator's responses to
each of twelve questions in a survey of state regulators conducted by Kirsten Engel. This
survey asked whether the regulator was aware of instances in which the state had relaxed, not
adopted, or not enforced an environmental standard due, at least in part, to concerns over the
impact of such action upon the location of new industry or the retention of existing industry
within their state. See Engel, supra note 8, at 377 (listing summary of all survey questions;
questions 5-14, 23, and 24, were the basis for the competiveness indicator). "Competitive-
ness" was calculated as the number of "yes" answers to each of these twelve survey questions,
and thus each survey respondent was assigned a competitiveness value that could range from
zero to twelve. The number of regulators responding from a given state ranged from zero to
four. Where more than one regulator responded from a given state in a given category, a
state's "competitiveness" was derived from the average of all responses. Because this "com-
petitiveness" value appeared to have an approximately log-normal distribution across survey
respondents, for regression analysis we used log(competitiveness + 1) as the competitiveness
indicator. In determining the association between the state's competitiveness and water pollu-
tion, only the responses of water pollution regulators was analyzed. Similarly, in determining
the association between the state's competitiveness and air pollution, only the responses of air
pollution regulators was analyzed. In determining the association between the state's degree
of competitiveness and various indicators of economic growth, the responses of both air and
water regulators were averaged together.
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mental indicators in those states (as might be expected under both the
efficiency and race-to-the-bottom hypotheses); and (2) no detectable im-
pact, and sometimes even a negative impact, on indicators of economic
performance (in contradiction to the prediction of the efficiency hypothe-
sis, but consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis). In the initial
analysis, for example, there was no detectable association between a
state's overall regulator competitiveness and the strength of its overall
"Green Policy." Partitioning environmental quality and regulator com-
petitiveness into water and air sub-categories, however, increased analyt-
ical precision and revealed a statistically significant (p<.05) negative
correlation (-0.5) between the degree of a state's competitiveness re-
ported by water regulators and the Green Index's indicator of state water
quality (Figure lA).5 1
At the same time, however, the analysis failed to indicate any de-
tectable positive correlation between a state's degree of environmental
regulator competitiveness and its economic performance. We tested the
associations between overall regulator competitiveness and a number of
different indicators of economic performance (Table 1), including growth
in employment, growth in per capita income, and growth in gross state
product. Additionally, the growth in state product data was tested both
as a whole and broken down by sector, including sectors which might
benefit disproportionately from a competitive reduction in environmental
standards, e.g., agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, manu-
facturing of durable and non-durable goods, transportation, etc. Correla-
tion coefficients were mostly insignificant. Two indicators, growth in
outputs from non-farm agriculture and the manufacture of durable goods,
however, were significantly negative (p<.05) in their association with en-
vironmental competitiveness. The analyses conducted thus far fail to
provide any support for the efficiency hypothesis that increased environ-
mental competitiveness leads to stronger economic performance. Indeed,
in some instances the association appears to go in the opposite direction.
51 The Green Index's composite score for water quality averages state rankings for toxic
chemical release to surface water and to public sewers, toxic chemical underground injections,
number of public sewers in noncompliance, investment in sewer needs until the year 2008,
miles of rivers, streams, lakes and reservoirs impaired, spending on water quality and develop-
ment, people served by groundwater, households served by own wells, households with septic
tank only, pesticide-contaminated groundwater, surface and groundwater possibly contami-
nated, water systems violating the Safe Drinking Water Act, water systems in significant non-
compliance, population with SDWA violations, and water use for drinking and cooking. See
HALL AN KERR, supra note 49, at 35-38. The Green Index's composite score for air quality is
based on similar indicators, including toxic releases into the air, National Ambient Air Quality
(NAAQ) violations, per capita emissions of S0 2, NO, CO 2, etc. See id
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TABLE 1. THE EFFECT OF REGULATOR COMPETITVENESS ON
ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY ACROSS STATES: SIMPLE CORRELATION
ANALYSIS. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS ARE IN BOLD,
WITH SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL INDICATED BY * (P<.05), AND **(P<.01).
Correlation between
"Competitiveness"W Indicator &
Environmental(') Indicators of: "competitiveness"() o
Overall "Green" Policy All Regulators +0.09
Air Quality Air Regulators only -0.16
Water Quality Water Regulators only -0.46*
Economic Indicators(d) growth rate of:
Gross State Product All regulators -0.09
Employment -0.03
Per-Capita Income -0.10
Growth in output, by sector:
Farm -0.05







Transportation & public utilities -0.08
Wholesale trade +0.03
Retail trade -0.14
Finance, insurance, & real estate -0.06
Services " -0.08
Government & public enterprise 1 +0.05
(a) Environmental indicators are based on a relative ranking (l="best" environmental quality) of
states by the "Green Index." See supra note 51. "Green Policy" is an overall indicator of the
strength of environmental policy generally, "water quality" and "air quality" are indicators of
environmental quality of those media only. Since a high rank corresponds to comparatively low
water quality, the negative rank was used in the correlation analysis so that positive correlations
indicate a positive relation between competitiveness and the given indicator.
(b) The competitiveness indicator was derived from regulator responses to a survey of stafe
environmental regulators. See supra note 50. Sample sizes were: N=45 (out of a possible 51 states)
in regressions on all regulators (no regulators from Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas,
Virginia, or West Virginia responded to the survey). N=33 states (regressions on air regulators
only), and N=28 states (water regulators only).
(c) Simple correlation coefficient (range -1.0 to +1.0). Positive values mean that regulator
competitiveness across states is positively associated with the indicator. Negative values indicate a
negative association between the two. Statistical power was sufficient to resolve correlations of 0.25
(all regulators), 0.31 (water regulators only), and 0.29 (air regulators only) at the 90% confidence
level, i.e., smaller real correlations would not be detected with confidence by this study.
(d) Economic indicators are from the U.S. Department of Commerce. See supra note 48. Economic
growth rates are an average over 10 years (1983-1992), based on 1987 fixed weights.
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FIGURE 1. GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF SOME OF THE CORRELATIONS
IN TABLE 1. COMPETITVENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORS IS
MORE OR LESS NEGATIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (A, B), BUT HAS LITLE (C), OR EVEN NEGATIVE (D)







0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Environmental 'Competitiveness'
(Water Regulators)
C. Gross State Product
* : : *
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Environmental 'Competitiveness'
(All regulators)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Environmental 'Competitiveness'
(Air Regulators)
D. Manufacture of Durable Goods
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Environmental 'Competitiveness'
(All Regulators)
2. Two Possible Critiques of The Empirical Analysis.
These results should be critically evaluated before accepting any
conclusions as definitive. Two important questions concerning this anal-
ysis are: (1) is the "competitiveness indicator" used an appropriate one?,
and (2) is it possible that unaccounted-for "confounding variables" are
masking the true relationship between competitiveness and economic or
environmental indicators in a way that makes the simple correlation anal-
I
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ysis of Table 1 and Figure 1 fundamentally misleading? Any attempt to
empirically probe complex questions will have potential problems. An
understanding of the means by which such problems might affect or
skew the outcome of the analysis help when determining whether these
problems significantly affect the results of the analysis. Once this under-
standing is established, it is possible to compensate for the effects of any
such problems on the analysis. Here we consider such issues in relation
to the two questions posed above.
The competitiveness indicator used was derived from state regulator
responses to survey questions.52 It is thus derived from regulators' self-
reported knowledge about various regulatory practices in his or her state
regulatory agency. The disadvantages of this approach are the following:
(1) the difficulty of controlling for differing regulator perceptions across
states; (2) the possibility of response bias in answers to survey questions;
and (3) the fact that the competitiveness indicator is generally a subjec-
tive rather than an objective one. Differing regulator perceptions arise
because the regulators responding in one state are different people from
those responding in other states, and may have different individual stan-
dards for what they consider to be "competitive." This gives rise to the
possibility that two states with the same level of "competitiveness," ac-
cording to some objective standard, may nonetheless be assigned differ-
ent values for their survey-derived competitiveness factors. This
problem will increase the variance, i.e., the "background noise," in esti-
mates of state competitiveness, but is less likely to cause a systematic
bias in one direction or another. Thus, although real correlations be-
tween competitiveness and economic or environmental indicators will be
harder to detect statistically, there is no reason for lack of confidence in
correlations that are detected at nominal levels of statistical significance.
Response bias to survey questions is another issue. In survey re-
search it is always possible for conscious or subconscious bias to influ-
ence the answers of survey respondents. In this case, as discussed in
greater detail by Engel,53 we believe that survey respondents, if anything,
are more likely to understate the willingness of their state to relax envi-
ronmental standards in the face of economic concerns. Although this
would cause an underestimation in the overall level of state regulator
"competitiveness," it may or may not influence the correlation analysis
presented here, since shifts in the mean of the variables in a correlation
analysis will not affect the degree of correlation or its statistical
significance.
In any case, neither of these issues are likely to create correlations
that are not there, but they may make it more difficult to detect true
52 See supra note 50.
53 See Engel, supra note 8, at 339-40.
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correlations. An ideal analysis of this issue might avoid some of these
issues by using objectively measurable standards of competitiveness,
perhaps based on analysis of the actual stringency of, e.g., pollutant
emission standards by state, and how they vary in response to stringency
in neighboring states, opportunities for in-state firm location, etc. This
may be possible in a future study of this issue. In the meantime, we offer
this approach, based on survey responses, as a limited but reasonable
initial analysis and test of the effect of regulatory competitiveness on
economic performance and environmental quality.
The second question, whether there are unaccounted for "con-
founding variables" that make the simple correlation analysis of Table 1
and Figure 1 fundamentally misleading, is a potentially more serious is-
sue. For example, there is no reason to believe, a priori, that the correla-
tions summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1 are causal. Even assuming
these correlations are causal, it is not readily apparent which direction the
causation runs. Economies are complex, and controlled by many factors.
These other factors could act as confounding variables that prevent sim-
ple correlation analysis from revealing the true positive effect of regula-
tory competitiveness. For example, not all states are equally competitive
on the regulatory front, and it may be that states whose economies are
performing poorly for underlying structural reasons are systematically
more likely to compete (e.g., their regulatory agencies might well be ex-
pected to come under increased political pressure to "give industry a
break" where possible in order to help stimulate the economy). Regula-
tors in states with strong economies may be much less likely to come
under such pressure. Thus, even if regulatorily competitive states have a
real, positive economic advantage over non-competitive states, there
could still be an overall negative correlation between economic perform-
ance and regulator competitiveness across all states. Under such a scena-
rio, the primary mechanism of causation runs in the other direction: poor
economies cause states to become more competitive. Although these ec-
onomically depressed states may realize a marginal improvement in their
economy from relaxing environmental standards, their economy may re-
main poor relative to non-competitive, strong economy states.
It is also possible that a similar kind of scenario underlies the appar-
ent negative association between regulator competitiveness and environ-
mental quality. For example, consider the above scenario, but with the
additional caveat that strong economies provide the necessary resources
to improve environmental quality. States with poor economies would
thus tend to also have poor environmental quality, and according to the
above scenario, would also have more competitive regulators. Under
these circumstances, there could be an overall negative correlation be-
19981
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tween regulator competitiveness and environmental quality even if com-
petitiveness had no actual impact on the environment.
The traditional tool to compensate for the effect of possibly con-
founding variables is multiple regression (or partial correlation) analysis.
Hence, in order to investigate whether such scenarios could account for
the apparent correlations reported in Table 1, we used multiple regres-
sion analysis to adjust for a variety of potentially confounding variables
that might mask the true relationship between regulator competitiveness
and both economic performance and environmental quality. Examples of
these analyses for GSP growth, water quality, and air quality are shown
in Table 2. For example, GSP growth in Table 2 is significantly and
positively associated with several factors (population growth, per capita
income, and growth in per capita income), but the inclusion of these po-
tentially confounding variables did not change the lack of correlation be-
tween GSP growth and regulator competitiveness: the statistically
insignificant simple correlation of -0.09 in Table 1 becomes an essen-
tially identical insignificant partial correlation of -0.12 in Table 2.
TABLE 2. THE EFFECT OF REGULATOR COMPETITIVENESS ON ECONOMY
AND ENVIRONMENT: MULTIPLE CORRELATION ANALYSIS TO ACCOUNT
FOR OTHER POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT CONFOUNDING VARIABLES.
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CORRELATIONS IS INDICATED BY BOLD: t
(P<10), * (P<.05), ** (P<.01), AND *** (P<.001)
Partial correlation
between indicator &
Economic Indicators Influencing variables influencing variable
Gross State Product Regulator competitiveness -0.12
Population growth +0.90***
Per capita income +0.25t
Per capita income growth +0.85***
Environmental Indicators
Water Quality Water regulator competitiveness -0.41*
Per capita income +0.37
Log (state population) -0.56***
Air Quality Air regulator competitiveness -0.09
Per capita income +0.36*
Log (state population) -0.57***
We conducted similar analyses for economic output growth rates by
sector (the farming, non-farm agriculture, mining, construction and man-
ufacturing sectors), exploring the effect of a range of potentially con-
founding variables (population size, population growth rates, overall size
of state's economy, growth rates of supporting sectors such as transporta-
tion, etc.) on the direction and significance of regulator competitiveness.
In no case did the inclusion of other explanatory factors make the associ-
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ation between sectoral growth rates and overall regulatory competitive-
ness significantly positive,54 as predicted by the efficiency hypothesis.
Multiple regression analysis on the environmental indicators like-
wise failed to alter the fundamental patterns previously revealed by sim-
ple correlation analysis. For example, environmental competitiveness
among water regulators remained significantly negatively correlated with
water quality, even after adjusting for other important, potentially causal,
variables such as population size and per capita income (Table 2).55
Similar patterns were observed between air regulator competitiveness
and air quality (Table 2), although as before, they did not rise to statisti-
cal significance at the ninety-five percent confidence level.
3. Summary: Results of the Empirical Analysis
The multiple regression analyses tend to reinforce the initial results
of the simple correlation analysis, and to refute the possibility that they
are artifacts. Because it is impossible to test all potentially confounding
variables, it is always possible that a variable not considered will change
prior interpretations. In addition, it is important to note that, as with any
empirical study, the statistical power to resolve correlations is limited by
the size of the dateset. For example, it is possible that there exist small
(less than 0.25) but undetectable positive correlations between competi-
tiveness and economic performance. It should also be noted, however,
that the statistical power of this analysis was sufficient to detect a
number of correlations, including negative associations between eco-
nomic performance and competitiveness (Table 1), and that it is equally
plausible that additional small but undetectable negative correlations ex-
ist. Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution given the
complexities involved. They are entirely consistent with the existence of
a race-to-the-bottom in environmental standard-setting, and are inconsis-
54 In one case (growth in output from farming), competition among water regulators had
a statistically significant positive association with growth when per capita income, farm out-
put, and overall GSP were also included in the regression model. This was counter-balanced
by a negative association of a similar magnitude between air regulators and growth in a similar
model. The net effect of regulatory competitiveness in this case is thus unclear. When overall
regulatory competitiveness was used, the association between competitiveness and growth in
farm output was always insignificantly negative.
55 In a regression of the Green Index indicator of a state's ordinal rank (1=best), by water
quality against water-regulator competitiveness, the correlation coefficient was r=0.46 (p=.02).
Since a high rank corresponds to comparatively lower water quality, the correlation between
water quality and competitiveness is negative. Regressing water quality rank against water-
regulator competitiveness, along with the log of state population and per capita income, gave
the following partial correlation coefficients: r=.41 (p=.04) for competitiveness, r=.56
(p=.000 6) for log of population size, and r=-.37 (p=.02) for per capita income. This suggests
that poor water quality (high rank) is correlated with large populations and anti-correlated with
income, but that even after adjusting for these important influences, poor water quality remains
significantly correlated with water regulator competitiveness.
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tent with the hypothesis that interstate competition is efficiency-enhanc-
ing. The results suggest that, contrary to the expectation that states will
realize economic gains to offset losses in welfare attributable to reduced
environmental quality, environmentally competitive states realize essen-
tially no economic gains. States that compete for industry through envi-
ronmental standard-setting thus appear to be "worse off' than states that
do not compete.
II. THE APPARENT "IRRATIONAL" BEHAVIOR OF STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORS
The above empirical conclusions point to an apparent enigma.
Studies indicate that industry location decisions are largely unaffected by
variations in the stringency of state environmental standards.5 6 In addi-
tion, as posited above, states that reportedly compete vigorously for in-
dustry by relaxing environmental standards do not fare any better in
terms of economic growth than states that do not employ environmental
standards to compete for industry. While survey results indicate that
many states were engaged in tightening their standards, 57 they also indi-
cate that a substantial minority of state environmental regulators report
that their state nevertheless relaxes the stringency of its environmental
laws in order to attract and retain industry.58 Several competing explana-
tions for this seemingly irrational behavior are examined below.
A. THm GAMES REGULATORS PLAY: SIMPLE GAME THEoRETIC
ILLUSTRATIONS OF REGLATOi BEHAVIOR
According to the available evidence on firm location decisions, 59
the payoffs to a single state from adopting more or less stringent environ-
mental laws should be analogous to those displayed below in Table 3,
"The Regulator's Reality." According to the structure of this game, a
state has only to gain from enacting optimally stringent environmental
laws, since it receives a payoff of 200 for maintaining optimally stringent
standards, but a payoff of only 100 if it lowers its standards, regardless of
what the other state does.60 The stringency of state environmental stan-
dards is of little to no importance to industries in choosing site loca-
tions. 61 Hence, improvements in environmental quality entail no trade-
offs in economic benefits and states will maximize net welfare by mak-
56 See Engel, supra note 8, at 340, 346.
57 See id. at 345.
58 See id. at 341-45.
59 See supra note 34.
60 The specific numbers shown in this example are hypothetical. Their relative values in
Table 3 and subsequent tables were chosen, however, to illustrate various plausible pay-off
structures for game-like interactions.
61 See supra note 35.
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ing environmental laws optimally stringent. Another consequence of the
negligible effect of stringency on firm locations is that each state's payoff
is not affected by what the other state does. Thus, the game represented
by Table 3 is a non-strategic one.
TABLE 3: THE "REGULATOR'S REALrrY" NET WELFARE PAYOFFS TO
Two JURISDICTIONS FROM RELAXING AND TIGHTENING
ENvimoNMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.
Payoffs are to: (State A, State B).
State A State B
Optimally Stringent Less Stringent
Environmental Standards Environmental Standards
Optimally Stringent
Environmental Standards (200, 200) (200, 100)
Less Stringent
Environmental Standards (100, 200) (100, 100)
Nevertheless, the practice of some states in relaxing their environ-
mental standards in order to attract and retain industry indicates that at
least some government decision-makers believe that the payoff structure
is different than that portrayed by industry location studies. Specifically,
by relaxing their state's standards, some state decision-makers are acting
as if the payoffs from doing so are greater than the payoffs from tighten-
ing environmental standards. Tables 4 and 5 ("the Regulator's Delusion"
I and II) illustrate two alternative perceived (but delusional) payoff struc-
tures for two states that could account for such behavior. Table 4 shows
payoffs that are consistent with decision-makers in both states relaxing
their environmental standards out of a perception (refuted in actuality by
the industry location studies) that one state experiences net welfare gains
by relaxing its environmental standards when another state maintains
more stringent standards. This payoff structure is also an example of that
present in the classic prisoner's dilemma.
Table 5 displays a payoff structure that causes behavior similar to
the classic prisoner's dilemma, insofar as both states relax their stan-
dards. But because the "best" decision by each state is unaffected by
what the other state decides, this game does not involve strategic interac-
tions between the states. Thus, the fact that many states relax their envi-
ronmental standards in order to attract or retain businesses is consistent
with at least two kinds of perceived games: a prisoner's dilemma-type
game (Table 4), and a non-strategic game like that illustrated in Table 5,
although there could plausibly be other games as well.
The following subsections examine the plausibility of several com-
peting explanations for why the payoff structure might appear to an in-
1998]
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TABLE 4: THE "REGULATOR'S DELUSION " PAYOFF STRUCTURE
CORRESPONDING TO REGULATOR'S "PERCEPTION" THAT RELAXED
ENVIRoNMENTAL STANDARDS IMPROVE STATE'S NET WELFARE:
PRISONER's-DILEMMA MODEL
Payoffs are to: (State A, State B).
State A State B
More Stringent Less Stringent
Environmental Standards Environmental Standards
More Stringent
Environmental Standards (300, 300) (100, 400)
Less Stringent
Environmental Standards (400, 100) (200, 200)
dustry regulator similar to that displayed in Table 4 or Table 5 (thus
inducing the regulator to relax her state's environmental standards),
rather than that displayed in Table 3 (which would compel the regulator
TABLE 5: THE "REGULATOR'S DELUSION I"' PAYOFF STRUCTURE
CORRESPONDING TO REGULATOR'S "PERCEPTION" THAT RELAXED
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS IMPROVE STATE'S NET WELFARE (No
STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETwERN STATES)
Payoffs are to: (State A, State B).
State A State B
More Stringent Less Stringent
Environmental Standards Environmental Standards
More Stringent
Environmental Standards (100, 100) (100, 300)
Less Stringent
Environmental Standards (300, 100) (300, 300)
to tighten, or maintain the state's environmental standards at optimally
stringent levels).
B. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE APPARENT IRRATIONALITY OF STATE
ENViRONMENTAL REGULATORS
1. Ignorance of Empirical Data on the Importance of
Environmental Stringency Upon Industry Location
One plausible explanation for why state environmental regulators
might perceive the payoff structure of variations in environmental strin-
gency to resemble those in Table 4 or Table 5, as opposed to Table 3, is
that state environmental decision-makers are simply unaware of the body
of empirical data demonstrating the unimportance of environmental strin-
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gency to firm location decisions. 62 This possibility is not difficult to im-
agine. The day-to-day world of the regulator is far removed from the
academic environment where industry location studies are conducted and
discussed.
Nevertheless, survey responses of state environmental regulators do
not fully support the assertion that regulators are wholly ignorant of the
relative unimportance of environmental stringency to firm location deci-
sions. First, although fifty-nine percent of the regulators surveyed an-
swered that they thought stringency of environmental standards was
"very important" or "fairly important" to industry location, regulators
correctly ranked environmental stringency as the least important factor
among the five factors provided.63 Thus, environmental regulators seem
cognizant of the relative unimportance of environmental stringency to
firm location.
Second, environmental regulators do not appear to obtain their in-
formation on matters relevant to interstate competition from groups, such
as industry, which have an incentive to tell regulators that the payoffs of
environmental stringency are those contained in Table 4 or Table 5. If
state regulators relied solely on business for their information, business
representatives might overstate the importance of stringency of environ-
mental standards in the hope of obtaining concessions from expensive
compliance requirements.64 Environmental regulators, however, do not
rely solely upon business groups for their information regarding inter-
state competition. Instead, environmental regulators, as a group, listed
industry representatives as a "minor information source," while they
ranked national organizations of state officials as a "major information
source." 65
Finally, the responses from the survey of state regulators appear in-
consistent with the payoff structure of the prisoner's dilemma set forth in
Table 4. According to the prisoner's dilemma model of interstate com-
petition, a state obtains the highest payoff when its standards are less
62 See Harold Wolman, Local Economic Development Policy: What Explains the Diver-
gence Between Policy Analysis and Political Behavior?, 10 J. URB. AFF. 19, 24 (1988) (sug-
gesting that ignorance of the "exceedingly arcane" research literature on the efficacy of
economic development incentives would explain politicians' continued practice of offering
fiscal incentives to firms to encourage them to locate within their jurisdiction, despite the
general conclusion of researchers that such incentives have little impact upon firm location
behavior).
63 See Engel, supra note 8, at 378 (Table 5). The other four factors were proximity to
transportation, nature of the labor force (e.g., age, skill, union membership), tax incentives and
subsidies, and proximity to natural resources.
64 Cf. Wolnan, supra note 62, at 25 (public officials may overrate the importance of
fiscal incentives and tax rates in determining firm location because "politicians' information
on location behavior comes from local business men, who routinely say that taxes make an
important difference.").
65 See Engel, supra note 8, at 382-83 (Table 5).
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stringent than those of a competing state. As a group, the regulators
responded that they "disagreed strongly" with the proposition that it is
important for one state's standards to be less stringent than those of an-
other state.66
2. The Influence of State Legislators and the Symbolic
Importance of Accommodating Business Interests
State legislative influence is a more plausible explanation for why
many states relax their environmental standards in order to attract or re-
tain industry. Previous studies have documented the dominant influence
of state legislators over state environmental policy.67 It is, therefore,
plausible to assume that the relaxation of a state's environmental stan-
dards is largely attributable to the influence of state legislators. In re-
sponse to survey questions, state legislators overstated the importance of
environmental stringency to industry location decisions by ranking it
third, rather than fifth, in importance out of the five siting factors listed.68
Furthermore, legislators were much more apt than environmental regula-
tors to claim that they sponsored or supported the relaxation of an envi-
ronmental standard in order to attract or retain industry.69
Even if one assumes the dominant influence of state legislators over
the state's decisions to increase or reduce the stringency of the state's
environmental standards, this does not answer the underlying question of
why states relax their standards to attract industry. Rather, this assump-
tion merely shifts the responsibility for such seemingly irrational behav-
ior from state environmental bureaucrats to elected state officials. Yet
why should the legislators, any more than the regulators, behave contrary
to what, according to industry location studies, is welfare-maximizing?
66 See id. at 383 (Table 5). Seventy-six of the eighty questionnaires received from state
environmental regulators recorded a response to the statement, "It is important that our state's
environmental standards be less stringent than the standards of neighboring states." The mean
value of the responses was 1.2, which is closest to 1.0, the value given by the questionnaire to
the response of "disagree strongly." The mean constituted the average of the following re-
sponses and their values: "disagree strongly" = 1; "disagree somewhat" = 2; "agree somewhat"
= 3; and "agree strongly" = 4.
67 See Scott P. Hays et al., Environmental Commitment Among the States: Alternative
Approaches to State Environmental Policy, 26 PuBLIus 41 (1996) ("The political preferences
of policymakers and the level of professionalism of state legislatures also exert significant
effects on state environmental commitment.").
68 See Engel, supra note 8, at 378 (Table 5).
69 See id. at 380-81 (Table 5, Questions 5-10, 13). The three exceptions to this involved
questions concerning permitting and enforcement. On three questions, state environmental
regulators reported that they were more likely to relax requirements than their state legislatures
would relax them through legislative enactment. However, permitting and enforcement, as
opposed to standard-setting, are issues with which a state legislator would not be expected to
be very familiar but with which a state environmental agency official would be expected to be
familiar. This discrepancy is, therefore, not surprising.
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In other words, why should legislators, any more than state agency offi-
cials, follow the payoff structure of Table 4 or Table 5, as opposed to that
set forth in Table 3?
Because a variant of this same question has haunted researchers in
the analogous area of state tax and fiscal incentives, the explanations
used to explain the similar paradox in state fiscal policy have direct rele-
vance for explaining the seemingly irrational behavior in state environ-
mental standard-setting. The broad consensus in the economic
development field is that most traditional economic development poli-
cies, such as tax incentives and subsidies, are ineffective in changing the
locational decisions of firms.70 Nevertheless, state policymakers con-
tinue to offer these same policies as a means of attracting industry. Thus,
a dilemma surfaces similar to that resulting from the propensity of some
states to relax environmental standards despite the evidence demonstrat-
ing the ineffectiveness of such actions in attracting or retaining industry.
Researchers in the economic development field explain the apparent
divergence between the economic development policies followed by
state decision-makers and the policies that would maximize the locality's
welfare by pointing out the lingering uncertainty over the efficacy of
state economic incentives in attracting industry, together with the sub-
stantial symbolic importance attached to providing such incentives. The
result is a system of political incentives or "payoffs" that drive a politi-
cian to offer industry location subsidies, even if such subsidies have a
low probability of success. 71 In short, a politician is better off providing
industry with a location subsidy than not providing such a subsidy since,
by offering the subsidy, she can claim credit for the siting of new indus-
try if a new plant does in fact choose to site locally, and can avoid blame
if industry ends up siting somewhere else. In the latter situation, the
politician can at least claim that she used the tools at her disposal to try
to attract new business to the community.
Since a reduction in environmental compliance costs is merely a
type of location incentive, the same factors discussed above could just as
easily apply to a state legislator's decision to relax environmental stan-
dards in order to attract or retain industry. The result can be a disparity
70 See, e.g., Charles J. Spindler & John P. Forrester, Economic Development Policy:
Explaining Policy Preferences Among Competing Models, 29 URB. A. Q. 28, 36 (1993);
Michael J. Wolkoff, Is Economic Development Decision Making Rational?, 27 URB. AF. 340,
343 (1992); Wolman, supra note 63, at 24; Jennifer L. Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling
Out: New Legislation on Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAw.
427, 433 (1995).
71 See Wohnan, supra note 62, at 25 ("High local unemployment and job loss are impor-
tant public concerns to which local politicians must be seen to respond.... As Feiock points
out, '[W]hen there is strong public pressure to 'do something' about the declining economy,
any visible action, even if ineffective, may be politically advantageous.'").
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between the payoffs experienced by a politician, in terms of political
benefits, and those experienced by the locality, in terms of net increases
in overall social welfare. The relaxation of environmental standards may
reduce a state's overall social welfare, yet, at the same time, it may ac-
crue sizable political benefits to the politician who claims credit for in-
dustry siting within the state. The potential disconnect between the
expected benefits from relaxed environmental standards to a politician,
on the one hand, and a state's citizenry, on the other, may explain why
many state regulators exhibit a willingness to relax standards in order to
attract industry even. though the evidence shows that lower standards
have little, if any, impact upon where industry chooses to locate. The
possibility of such a disconnect is illustrated by Table 6, which depicts a
hypothetical example72 with a disparity between the expected net social
welfare benefits to a state from relaxing its environmental standards to
attract industry and the expected political benefits that a legislator re-
sponsible for such standards is likely to receive.73
Table 6 illustrates a situation in which it is in the best interest of a
politician to engineer a relaxation of the state's environmental standard
in an effort to attract industry even though the relaxation of standards
causes her state to suffer in terms of net social welfare. Table 6(A)
shows the impact, upon a state's net social welfare, of a hypothetical
decision to relax or not relax a state's environmental standard. Consis-
tent with the evidence from industry location studies, we have assumed,
in constructing this hypothetical cost-benefit structure, that the relaxation
of environmental standards will have essentially no effect upon indus-
try's decision to locate in-state. Because it is possible that an industry
72 The example set forth in Table 6 is an elaboration and adaptation of an example
presented by Wolman, which he uses to illustrate that even when the probability that economic
incentives will succeed in attracting industry is low, a politician can reap greater political
benefits from offering such incentives than from failing to offer such incentives. See Wolman,
supra note 63, at 26. Our hypothetical example in Table 6 is similar to Wolman's, in that it
demonstrates why a politician is better off relaxing environmental standards than not relaxing
environmental standards, even though relaxed standards are of no importance in firm location
decisions. Our example is different from Wolman's, in that it also explicitly shows how the
preferred decision of a politician (relaxing environmental standards) can be opposite of the
decision that results in the greatest net benefit to the locality as a whole (i.e., not relaxing
environmental standards).
73 The term "expected benefits" is used here and in Table 6 in its traditional Bayesian'
utilitarian sense, where the "expected" benefit or utility derived from a decision is defined as
the weighted sum of the utilities of each of the possible outcomes, with the weights equal to
the probabilities of each outcome. Table 6 is an example of a case where there are two possi-
ble, mutually exclusive outcomes (the industry either locates in-state, or does not locate in-
state). The expected utility, or net welfare, is thus ulp, + u2p2, where uI is the utility associated
with outcome one, u2 is the utility associated with outcome two, and pi and P2 are the
probabilities of each outcome being realized. If the two outcomes are the only two possibili-
ties, then p1 + P2 must equal one. See K. S. SrmADER-FPacHrrra, RISK AND RA-IONALrrY
101-04 (1991).
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TABLE 6. COST-BENEFIT STRUCTURE POSED By A HYPoTHEICAL
ENVIRONMENTAL-STANDARD RELAXATION DECISION TO (A) THE STATE
As A WHOLE, AND (B) INDIrIDuAL POLITICAL DECISION-MAKER.
(A) Social welfare of state as a whole. (Rational decision: do not relax standards)
(3) (4)
Net Social Expected Net
(1) (2) Welfare to Social
Economic Environmental State Welfare (Net
Cost/Benefit Quality Cost/ (Economic + Social
Industry Probability from Industry Benefit from Environmental Welfare x
Politician's Location of Location Location Politician's Benefits/ Probability
Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision Costs) of Location)
Relax Env.
Standards in-state .25 100 -25 75 18.75
out-of-state .75 0 -25 -25 -18.75
Combined expected net welfare benefit from relaxing standards: 0
Do Not
Relax Env.
Standards in-state .25 100 0 100 25
out-of-state .75 0 0 0 0
Combined expected net welfare benefit from not relaxing standards: 25
(preferred)
(B) Individual welfare of political decision-maker. (Rational decision: do relax standards)
(1) (3) (4)
Political Cost! Net Political Expected Net
Benefit (2) Benefit Political
Corresponding Political Cost/ (Social Benefit (Net
to Net Social Benefit from Welfare + Political
Industry Probability Welfare to Individual Individual Benefit x
Politician's Location of Location State (see Credit/Blame Credit/Blame Probability
Decision Decision Decision A(3)) Factor Factor) of Location)
Relax Env.
Standards in-state .25 75 50 125 31.25
out-of-state .75 -25 0 -25 -18.75




Standards in-state .25 100 0 100 25
out-of-state .75 0 -50 -50 -31.25
Combined expected net political benefit from not relaxing standards: -6.25
Note: Table 6 assumes that industry location probabilities (25% in-state, 75% out-of-state) are unaffected by the
decision whether or not to relax standards, and that rational decision-making under uncertainty follows the
conventional Bayesian model. See supra note 73 (describing the Bayesian model). The net social welfare
consequences to the state are the sum of the economic benefits associated with the industry siting decision, and the
environmental quality impact of the political standard-setting decision. The individual benefits to the political
decision-maker are the sum of a net social welfare component (which simply reflects the social welfare benefit to
the state as a whole), and an individual credit/blame component which arises from the politician's perceived
responsibility for attracting or repelling the industry.
will locate in the state anyway for other reasons (e.g., availability of la-
bor, markets, or transportation), but that the high demand for such indus-
tries make the siting less likely than the industry's siting elsewhere, the
probability that the industry will locate in-state is assumed to be twenty-
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five percent, while the probability that it will locate out-of-state, seventy-
five percent.
Consider first the case in Table 6A where a state chooses to relax its
environmental standards, thereby subjecting itself to an environmental
cost of -25 no matter what industry does. If industry chooses to locate in
the state, the state will experience an economic benefit of 100, which
after subtracting the -25 due to increased environmental damage results
in a net social welfare benefit of seventy-five. Because it is only twenty-
five percent likely that the industry will actually locate in-state, the ex-
pected net social welfare benefit from industry locating in-state is thus 75
x 25% = 18.75. Nevertheless, this expected benefit from an in-state sit-
ing decision is cancelled out by the expected negative consequences
(-18.75) of an industry decision to locate elsewhere. Hence, a state's
combined expected net social welfare benefit from relaxing its standards
is exactly zero.
In contrast, when a state does not relax its standard, the state reaps a
combined expected net social benefit of twenty-five (100 in benefits if
the industry locates in-state, times the twenty-five percent probability
that this will happen, plus zero in benefits if the industry does not locate
in-state times the seventy-five percent probability of that outcome). Be-
cause the state has not relaxed its standard, it does not risk ending up
with a net loss in the case that industry chooses to locate elsewhere.
From this matrix of incentives, it is obvious that a state maximizes its
expected net social welfare by adopting the strategy of not relaxing its
environmental standards.
-The same conclusion does not necessarily hold, however, for politi-
cians who may be perceived by the public as bearing some portion of
responsibility for an industry's location decision. In order to account for
this in the risk-benefit structure depicted in Table 6B, a political deci-
sion-maker's individual welfare equals the sum of two components: a
component reflective of the actual social welfare of the state (Table 6B,
col. (1)), whatever that may be, and a component'related to the perceived
direct credit or blame that the public assigns to her for the industry's
location decision (Table 6B, col. (2)). This second component creates a
wedge between the social welfare of the state and the individual welfare
of the politician, giving rise to the possibility that the rational choice for
a politician is against the best interest of the constituents she represents.
The credit/blame factor of Table 6B makes a difference in two cases:
when a politician decides to relax standards at the same time industry
locates within state (in which case the politician accrues a benefit of fifty
due to public perception that she deserves credit for bringing the benefits
of industry to the state), and when a politician fails to relax standards at
the same time that an industry locates out-of-state (in which case the
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politician suffers a loss of -50 due to the blame assigned by the public
for losing the economic benefits that the industry would have brought).74
The net result of the wedge between public welfare and an individual
politicians welfare (Table 6B, col (2)) is to make the politician's rational
decision the reverse of the rational decision for the public welfare as a
whole, as shown by the expected net political benefit illustrated in Table
6B, col (4). Given the payoff structure set forth in Table 6B, our politi-
cian acts rationally by offering the industry a relaxed environmental stan-
dard, even if she knows for a fact that a reduced environmental standard
will not influence the industry to site in her state.
The point of the hypothetical exercise of Table 6 is not to show that
the rational decisions of state politicians about environmental standards
are always at odds with their constituents' best interest.75 The point,
rather, is to suggest a plausible, rational account that is consistent with
the evidence and which suggests that in the absence of a federal environ-
mental backstop, a substantial minority of states are apparently willing to
lower their environmental standards for little or no apparent economic
benefit. There may of course be other plausible, rational accounts, and
our point is also not to suggest that this particular account is preferable to
other plausible ones. The point of this example is to illustrate the emi-
nent plausibility (and indeed the virtual undeniable reality) of state-level
perverse incentives of some kind that cause the rational best-interest of
state decision-makers to diverge from those on whose behalf they make
decisions. Once the existence of such incentives is granted (whether they
are of the symbolic kind illustrated here, or more concrete ones like cam-
paign contributions from industries that pollute), then the empirical con-
clusions of Part I, that some states appear willing to act irrationally,
should not be puzzling or surprising; indeed they should be expected.
Note that perverse incentives, of the type illustrated in Table 6, are
less likely to exist in federal environmental standard-setting. The uni-
form nature of most federal standards provides less opportunity for state
74 We assume that the political creditlblame factor is otherwise zero. For example, in the
case where a standard is relaxed, but the industry nonetheless goes elsewhere, public anger is
assumed to be ameliorated by the apparent fact that the politician "at least tried." In the
converse case, where a standard is not relaxed and the industry locates in-state, the politician
loses the opportunity to take special credit for that fact. Also note, that this political credit/
blame factor, as constructed, is asymmetric with respect to the perceived responsibility of the
politician for economic outcomes versus environmental outcomes, i.e., a politician is per-
ceived as bearing some responsibility for industry location decisions, but is neither blamed for
increased pollution nor credited for maintaining environmental protections. This could be a
plausible assumption for reasons analogous to those that explain why environmental goods are
undervalued by private markets in the first place: their benefits are diffuse public goods, but
the costs of preserving them are obvious and fully accounted for by private markets.
75 The precise numbers of Table 6 are, after all, purely hypothetical and do not "prove"
anything one way or another.
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representatives at the national level to use environmental standards to
attract industry to particular states or localities. Such mechanisms might,
of course, come. into play at the international level vis-h-vis individual
countries.
III. A RATIONAL RISK-BENEFIT ALTERNATIVE TO THE
IDEOLOGICAL "STACKED DECK"
In his recent response to his critics, Revesz argues for a "rebuttable
presumption in favor of decentralization" in environmental regulation
generally.76 This presumption, according to Revesz, is based upon the
assumption that, in addition to differences in the geography of various
regions within the United States, each region differs in its preferences for
environmental protection. 77 Furthermore, it is based upon the assump-
tion that the relative costs and benefits of environmental policies differ
across geographic regions and the federal government is ill-equipped to
respond to these geographic differences. 78 The presumption for decen-
tralized regulation should be rebutted, according to Revesz, only if there
is a "systemic evil in letting states decide the level of environmental pro-
tection that will apply within their jurisdictions. '79 Thus, Revesz pro-
poses a construct that is, in essence, an ideological "stacked deck" in
favor of the efficiency hypothesis. According to this construct, the effi-
ciency hypothesis is presumed true in the absence of any evidence what-
soever, whereas the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is alone saddled with
the difficult burden of empirical refutation.
Even if one accepts Revesz's "stacked deck," we argue that, in the
specific instance of environmental regulatory policy, we have presented
an empirical analysis that carries that burden: evidence presented here
and in Engel's prior article rebuts Revesz's "presumption for decentrali-
zation" argument. This evidence suggests that there is, in fact, a "sys-
temic evil"-a failure of state regulators to establish welfare-maximizing
environmental standards-inherent in state environmental standard-set-
ting. Moreover, even by the skewed standards of a stacked deck, we
argue that federal environmental standards are a reasonable response to
an empirically well-founded concern about a race-to-the-bottom in state-
level environmental standard-setting.
As a general approach to resolving disputes about regulatory policy
(or any other kind of controversy, for that matter), the "stacked deck"
leaves much to be desired. It is an overly flexible rhetorical device
which, in the absence of a reality based anchor, can be applied from any
76 See supra note 23.
77 See Revesz, supra note 18, at 536.
78 See id. at 535-37.
79 Id. at 537.
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direction the writer desires. As Revesz readily admits in the context of
the debate about the appropriate level of government for environmental
regulation, his opponents could argue just as easily as he for a "rebutta-
ble presumption," but in the opposite direction: in favor of centralized
environmental regulation which may only be "rebutted" by evidence of a
"systemic evil" in federal regulation.80 Such a presumption in favor of
federal regulation could be based upon consideration of the protection of
minimum standards of health as a human right that is guaranteed
throughout the United States, or upon the considerable economies of
scale in the scientific research and decision-making underlying environ-
mental standard-setting, or upon any number of preferred theories.
In the end, however, such an approach leads to an endless academic
game of "deck stacksmanship." Instead, we prefer a decision-making
approach based on empirically-grounded estimates of the risks, benefits,
and uncertainties of various policy alternatives. Such a policy decision-
making approach not only requires that the available evidence be used in
making the decision, but also that an attempt is made to take account of
the risk of being wrong in addition to the benefits of being right. The
discipline and analytic tools of risk analysis were developed largely for
just this purpose: systematically using evidence to make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty. 81 This article is not the place for a detailed
risk analysis, but we can take advantage of the insights of that discipline,
especially concerning the need to take into account the consequences of
being wrong.
Prudent policy-making requires that we ask questions like: what are
the costs to society if environmental regulations are set by the federal
government because of a fear of a race-to-the-bottom, but it turns out that
there is no race-to-the-bottom problem? And importantly, how do those
costs compare to the costs to society if individual states are allowed to
set standards on the grounds of the efficiency hypothesis, but it turns out
that the efficiency hypothesis is wrong, and there is in fact a race-to-the-
bottom?
If there is no race-to-the-bottom, then uniform nationwide environ-
mental standards will introduce inefficiencies that will cause the sum to-
tal national social welfare to be less than it would be if states were each
allowed to set their own standards as they saw fit. The cost of such a
mistaken policy is equal to the size of the reduction in welfare that the
policy causes. The empirical studies on firm location decisions cited ear-
80 See id
81 See, e.g., M. GRANGER MORGAN AND MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GuIDE TO
DEAUNG WrrH UNCERTAINTY IN QuANTrTATrVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1990);
SHRADER-FRcHmrE, supra note 73 (for an overview of the field of risk analysis and its
applications).
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lier in this article suggest that this reduction is likely to be small, possibly
negligibly small. This is because these studies generally find that the
stringency of environmental standards is a small to negligible factor in
industry location decisions. Thus, the inefficiency introduced by
preventing states from competing on environmental standards must like-
wise be small to negligible, in comparison to the size of the economic
activity generated by these industries.
Proponents of the efficiency hypothesis may not be persuaded by
this. They would possibly argue that the existence of an avoidable ineffi-
ciency is objectionable: after all, if we can avoid the inefficiency and
gain a small benefit from separate state standards, why not? A small
benefit is better than no benefit, they might argue. The reason "why
not," however, is that they might be wrong. If they are wrong, and there
is a race-to-the-bottom, but the federal minimum standard backstop were
nonetheless mistakenly abandoned, what would be the cost of this mis-
take? The answer to this is not obvious, but depends on how far down
"the bottom" is in the race-to-the-bottom that would follow from a
wholesale abandonment of federal standards. Prior to the adoption of the
suite of federal environmental laws that are now in place, environmental
quality in many areas was much lower, and environmental protection
much weaker, than it is today.82 It is possible that, because of all that has
been learned in the thirty years since the onset of the major federal envi-
ronmental protection laws, and because of greater public awareness, that
states, even left to their own devices, would not retreat to their previous
laissez-faire positions on environmental regulation. It is also possible,
however, given the potentially great political pressure placed on state
regulators, especially in states with faltering economies, that the harm
done by dangerously lax standards to human health and to irreplaceable
natural resources could be enormous and irreversible.
In sum, the available evidence suggests that there is a race-to-the-
bottom in state environmental standard-setting. The evidence also sug-
gests that if this conclusion is wrong, the costs of policies implemented
on the (mistaken) assumption that it is right will likely be small. On the
other hand, if policies are implemented on the assumption that interstate
competition is efficiency-enhancing, and that assumption is wrong, the
costs of that mistake are uncertain, but possibly very large. We con-
82 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92"d Cong. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3671
('The task of setting water quality standards, assigned to the States by the 1965 legislation, is
lagging. More than 4 years after the deadline for submission of standards, only a little more
than half of the States have fully approved standards."); 116 CoNG. REc. 42382 (Dec. 18,
1970) (Sen. Muskie) ("In 1963, the Congress recognized that the Federal Government could
not handle the enforcement task alone, and that the primary burden would rest on States and
local governments. State and local governments, however, did not respond adequately to this
challenge.... The Federal presence and backup authority had to be increased.").
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clude, therefore, that the maintenance of federal minimum standards, and
the protection against the possibility of a state regulatory race-to-the-bot-
tom, is clearly the more prudent and rational public policy choice. 83 Cer-
tainly, minimum federal standards should not be abandoned without
some alternative in their place to guard against the possibility of a de-
structive race-to-the-bottom between states. 84
CONCLUSION
Try as they might, legal theorists cannot will away empirical reali-
ties. Theories that rest upon certain suppositions about empirical reality
must deal with evidence concerning those suppositions. The race-to-the-
bottom rationale for federal regulation supports imposing minimum envi-
ronmental standards at the federal level. The validity of this rationale
ultimately rests upon empirical evidence of state behavior. In an earlier
article, Engel provided empirical evidence for the existence of a race-to-
the-bottom in state environmental standard-setting. Unfortunately, in his
83 In this instance, because the preferred policy option is relatively clear, we have
avoided, what in general can be a more complicated decision, between policy options given
uncertain knowledge about the state-of-the-world. There are two prominent strategies for de-
cision-making under uncertainty. The Bayesian strategy, see supra note 73, is the more com-
mon, and seeks to maximize the expected utility of a decision. The "maximin" strategy is a
more risk-averse strategy, and seeks to maximize the minimum utility, and thereby avoid the
worse outcome. See SHRADER-FREcH=Tra, supra note 73, at ch. 8 (tracing the philosophical
origins of these decision strategies, and arguing for the maximin strategy as preferable for
public decision-making). According to the full formalism of the Bayesian strategy, the ques-
tion over the appropriate level of government regulation would be decided by choosing the
level of government regulation that maximized expected net social welfare or utility. Thus, if
u(fed-race-to-the-bottom) and u(fed-efficiency) are the utilities (or welfare) associated with
a federally-based regime of environmental law, in the cases that, respectively, (a) a race-to-the-
bottom exists, and (b) efficiency in interstate competition exists; and if u(state-race-to-the-
bottom) and u(state-efficiency), are the utilities associated with a state-based regime of envi-
ronmental law for the same cases, and if p is the probability that the state-of-the-world was
such that a race-to-the-bottom existed (and hence 1-p is the probability of efficient conditions
holding), then the expected net social welfare of a federal regime would be Ufd = p u(fed-
race-to-the-bottom) + (1-p) u(fed-efficiency), and the expected net social welfare of a state
regime would be U,. = p u(state-race-to-the-bottom) + (1-p) u(state-efficiency). The
rational policy choice, under a Bayesian strategy, would then be to otherwise choose a federal
regime if UQf a> U,,,, and to choose a state regime otherwise. The maximin strategy would not
choose the policy that maximized expected utility, but would instead choose the policy with
the highest benefit (i.e. lowest cost) associated with being wrong. In other words, it would
only focus on u(fed-efficiency) and u(state-race-to-the-bottom), the utilities associated with
being wrong, and would choose a federal regime if u(fed-efficiency) > u(state-race-to-the-
bottom), and a state regime otherwise. The "maximin" strategy has the advantage of giving a
well-defined decision, even when the probabilities associated with each possible state-of-the-
world are not known.
84 See Engel, supra note 8, at 367-74 (reviewing some approaches to regulatory reform
that would both provide for more flexibility in environmental regulation than is found with the
current minimum federal standard approach, but would also take to heart the lessons of game
theory about how enforceable agreements between parties can prevent destructive races to the
bottom).
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response, Revesz either ignores this evidence or side-steps it, preferring
to hold on to ideological considerations that favor primary reliance upon
state environmental regulation. In this article, we have presented addi-
tional empirical analysis that extends and confirms Engel's earlier work
and we have sought to emphasize the importance of empirical grounding
for abstract theories, especially in the context of decisions about public
policy where real-world consequences will follow.
Beyond that, we have advanced possible explanations for the appar-
ently irrational behavior of state environmental regulators. Although evi-
dence suggests that more stringent environmental standards cost a state
few, if any, industry relocations or initial industry sitings, a substantial
minority of states nonetheless express an inclination to relax standards in
order to attract or retain industry. Drawing on work in the economic and
urban development literature that has developed in response to similar
puzzles with regard to taxes and financial incentives, we suggest that the
seemingly irrational behavior of state and local officials could arise from
an incentive structure that is different for individual decision-makers than
for the state as a whole. It is plausible that a race-to-the-bottom results
from state decision-makers' rational responses to incentive structures that
diverge from those of the public welfare. This mechanism is different
from that offered by the classic prisoner's dilemma, but the consequences
are the same: a race-to-the-bottom in state environmental standard-set-
ting that results in lower environmental quality and reduced -social
welfare.
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